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Abstract
This paper analyses the implications of monetary policy changes on the welfare in the U.S economy over
the pre-1984 and post-1984 periods. We use a New-Keynesian model with trend inflation based on Ascari,
Phaneuf and Sims (2015). First, our results show that the welfare costs respond symmetrically to a rise and
a decline in trend inflation, trend growth and the level of volatility of output, output growth and inflation
over the sample periods. Second, we find that changes in monetary policy and in trend inflation across the
two subsamples play an important role in the shift of macroeconomic variables volatilities unconditionally
and conditionally to neutral technology, marginal efficiency of investment and monetary shocks.
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1 Introduction
The period from the late 1960s through the early 1980s in the U.S economy1 and the subsequent
decline in macroeconomic variables volatilities in the Great Moderation era, have received a lot of
attention in the literature.
In an early contribution, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) explored the role of monetary policy
in macroeconomic stability. They estimate a Taylor-type monetary policy rule and combine it
with a calibrated sticky-price framework with zero steady-state inflation. They show that there
is a significant difference in the way monetary policy was conducted; interest rate policy in the
Volcker period seems to have been much more responsive to changes in expected inflation than in
the pre-Volcker period. They find that this difference could be an important source of the shift in
macroeconomic variables volatilities. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Boivin and Giannoni (2006)
and Zandweghe, Hirose and Kurozumi (2015) also reach the same conclusion.
However, the recent paper of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) challenges this view. Based on an
estimated Taylor rule and a calibrated staggered-price model with non-zero trend inflation, they
attribute the shift to changes in the Feds response to macroeconomic variables and the decline in
trend inflation during the Volcker disinflation. This finding is confirmed by Arias, Ascari, Branzoli
and Castelnuovo (2015).
More recently, Christiano (2015) argues that the high inflation of the 1970s may have had a cost
equivalent to a loss of 10 percent of GDP or more in each year that the inflation was high. However,
the aforementioned literature has been silent about the implications of the welfare.
In this paper, we explore the link between non-zero trend inflation and macroeconomic variables
volatility in the pre- and post-1984 periods. Then we analyze the implications of policy changes
for welfare in both sample periods. The main contribution of the paper is to examine the role of
non-zero steady-state inflation in the U.S economy’s shift from the pre-1984 to the post-1984 era
as well as the implications for the welfare.
1The U.S economy experienced high and volatile inflation along with several severe recessions (Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler, 2000).
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To address these issues, we use a medium-scale DSGE model inspired by Ascari, Phaneuf and
Sims (2015). However, our approach is quite different. First, consistent with evidence in Gali and
Gambetii (2009) we split the sample into 1960:I -1983:IV and 1984:I - 2007:III subsample periods
whereas they describe a full sample results. Second, in line with Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000),
we first calibrate the Fed’s reaction function in the pre- and post-1984 periods based on estimates
in the literature. We then combine it with our calibrated medium-scale New Keynesian model.
Based on evidence in the literature, we assume that structural parameters do not change over the
subsample periods except for shocks parameters, trend inflation and real per capita output growth.
It is worth noting that real per capita output growth originates from two main sources : trend
growth in investment-specific technology (IST) and in neutral technology.
The trend growth rate of the investment shock is chosen to match the average growth rate of the
relative price of investment in the data, and then the trend growth rate of the neutral shock is
picked to match the observed average growth rate of output per capita, given the growth rate of
the investment shock. Trend inflation is set at its observed value.
As in Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2015), the magnitudes of neutral technology, Marginal Efficiency
of Investment (MEI), and monetary shocks in each subsample period are selected to (i) match the
observed volatility of output growth in the data at respective rate of trend inflation and to (ii)
hit a variance share of output growth of 35-50-15 percent for neutral, MEI, and monetary shocks,
respectively.
We find the following results. First, welfare costs respond symmetrically to a rise and a decline in
trend inflation, trend growth and the level of volatility of output, output growth and inflation over
the pre- and post-1984 era respectively. An increase in the variance of shocks to the trend inflation
process increases means welfare costs by increasing the volatilities of output and inflation in the
pre-1984 period. The welfare costs in the post-1984 period are modest.
More specifically, the results show that based on means, the welfare cost of going from 0 to 4.75
percent inflation, in the pre-1984 period, is about 8.38 in the baseline case and 4 percent of con-
sumption in the case without trend growth; in terms of steady states, it is 7.56 and 2.26 percent of
consumption respectively. Consumption equivalent losses do depend on the overall level of volatility,
trend growth and trend inflation.
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The welfare cost of 2.29 percent inflation, in the Great Moderation period, in terms of mean is
about 2.34 in the baseline case and 0.14 percent of consumption in the case without trend growth;
in terms of steady states, it is around 2.26 and 0.12 percent of consumption respectively. The
means change by more than the steady states and exceed the steady state losses.
Second, we find that the way monetary policy was conducted over both subsamples along with
changes in trend inflation play an important role in the shift of macroeconomic variables volatilities
unconditionally and conditionally to neutral technology, marginal efficiency of investment and mon-
etary shocks. We concur with the original conclusion of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Lubik
and Schorfheide (2004) and Zandweghe, Hirose and Kurozumi (2015). However, our results are in
line with those of Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Arias, Ascari, Branzoli and Castelnuovo
(2015).
This paper is in line with a set of papers that examines the effects of non-zero trend inflation on
macroeconomic dynamics in New Keynesian models. Ascari and Ropele (2007) study the effects
of non-zero trend inflation for optimal monetary policy, while Amano, Moran, Murchison, and
Rennison (2009) examine the implications for the optimal rate of inflation. Amano, Ambler, and
Rebei (2007) explore the implications for the time-series properties of macro variables, Ascari and
Ropele (2009), and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) study the effect of trend inflation on the
determinacy of the model. This paper differs from theirs as it studies the effects of monetary policy
changes for the welfare costs over the pre- and post-1984 periods.
The paper closest to ours, in line with the ”effects of non-zero trend inflation” literature, is the
one by Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2015). It addresses the welfare and cyclical implications of
moderate trend inflation whereas we explore the monetary policy changes over the pre- and post-
1984 subsample periods and its welfare implications.
Our paper is also closely related to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). However, we use sticky
price and sticky wage model extended to non-zero trend inflation, trend growth and roundabout
production structure whereas they use a sticky price model based on zero trend inflation. They find
that changes in the Fed’s policy constitute the main source of the shift in macroeconomic variables
volatilities whereas we find that both monetary policy changes and the shift in trend inflation over
the subsample periods are the main causes.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we outline our baseline model specifi-
cation. In Section 3, we discuss the calibration of the structural parameters.We present results in
Section 4, and the last section concludes.
2 The Model
In this section, model specification is outlined. More details on full set of stationarized equili-
bium conditions can be found in ?.
2.1 Firms and Price setting
2.1.1 Final Goods Producers
The final good producer uses Xt(j) units of intermediate goods to produce Xt units of final
good. There is a continuum of intermediate goods firms indexed by j ∈ (0, 1), producing differenti-
ated goods. The final good is a constant elasticity of substitution aggregate of intermediate goods
with θ > 1, using the production technology given by :
Xt =
(∫ 1
0
Xt(j)
θ−1
θ dj
) θ
θ−1
. (1)
The final goods producer maximizes profit, given a final good price, Pt and taking intermediate
good prices, Pt(j), as given. The first-order condition gives the conditional demand for intermediate
good j :
Xt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
Xt, ∀j. (2)
Inserting the demand function for input j back into the CES aggregator gives the aggregate price
index:
P 1−θt =
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−θdj. (3)
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2.1.2 Intermediate Producers
Each intermediate-good firm, indexed by j, uses K̂t(j)
2 units of capital services, Lt(j) units of
labour, and intermediate inputs, Γt(j), to produce Xt(j) units of the intermediate good j. Its
production function is given by :
Xt(j) = max
{
AtΓt(j)
φ
(
K̂t(j)
αLt(j)
1−α
)1−φ −ΥtF, 0} , (4)
where φ ∈ (0, 1) is the intermediate input share while α ∈ (0, 1) and (1− α) are value-added share
with respect to capital services and labor inputs, F is a fixed cost, that is identical accross fims.
We choose F to keep profits to be zero along a balanced growth path, given a growth factor Υt
3,
so that firm entries and exits are ruled out.
The neutral technology At follows a process with both a trending and stationary component :
At = A
τ
t A˜t, (5)
where the deterministic trend component Aτt grows at the gross rate gA ≥ 1 in each period4 such
that :
Aτt = gAA
τ
t−1. (6)
The stochastic process driving the detrended level of technology A˜t is given by
A˜t =
(
A˜t−1
)ρA
exp
(
sAu
A
t
)
, (7)
which, taking its natural logarithm, yields
ln A˜t = ρA ln A˜t−1 + sAuAt , u
A
t ∼ iid (0, 1) . (8)
2It is the product of utilization and physical capital
3For more details on growth factor, see Ascari,Phaneuf, and Sims (2015) on page 11.
4With the implicit normalization that it begins at 1 in period 0 i.e Aτ0 = 1
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The autoregressive parameter ρA governs the persistence of the process and satisfies 0 ≤ ρA< 1.
The shock is scaled by the known standard deviation equal to sA and u
A
t is the innovation, drawn
from a mean zero normal distribution.
Cost Minimization
The producer of differentiated goods j is assumed to set its price, Pt(j), according to Calvo pricing
(Calvo, 1983) and decide in every period its quantities of intermediates, capital services, and labor
input. The cost of intermediate is just the aggregate price level, Pt. The user cost of capital and
labor are Rkt and Wt (in nominal terms), respectively.
The cost-minimization problem of a typical firm choosing its inputs is given by :
min PtΓt(j) +R
k
t K̂t +WtLt(j) (9)
subject to
AtΓt(j)
φ
(
K̂t(j)
αLt(j)
1−α
)1−φ −ΥtF ≥ (Pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
Xt
The first order conditions yield the following marginal cost and conditional demand functions for
the inputs used in the production of Xt(j) :
Γt(j) = φmct (Xt(j) + ΥtF ) , (10)
K̂t(j) = α(1− φ)mct
rkt
(Xt(j) + ΥtF ) , (11)
Lt(j) = (1− α)(1− φ)mct
wt
(Xt(j) + ΥtF ) . (12)
6
Profit Maximization and Price Setting
Each intermediate producing firm5 chooses its price Pt(j) that maximizes the expected present
discount value of its future profit. The firm problem is given by :
max
Pt(j)
Et
∞∑
h=0
(ξp)
hDt,t+h (Pt(j)Xt+h(j)− V (Xt+h(j))) (13)
subject to
Xt+h(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt+h
)−θ
Xt+h
where Dt,t+h is the discount rate for future profits and V (Xt(j)) is the total cost of producing good
Xt(j). Note that Dt,t+h =
βhλt+h
λt
. Written in real terms, it is
Pt+hDt,t+h
Pt
. Hence, the real discount
factor is
βhPt+hλt+h
Ptλt
, which we can write as:
βhλrt+h
λrt
, where λrt = Ptλt. The first-order condition for
p∗t (j) is :
p∗t (j) =
θ
θ − 1
∞∑
h=0
(ξpβ)
hλrt+hνt+h(j)pi
θ
t+1,t+hXt+h
∞∑
h=0
(ξpβ)
hλrt+hpi
θ−1
t+1,t+hXt+h
, (14)
where p∗t (j) =
Pt(j)
Pt
is the real optimal price and νt the real marginal cost, which is equal to
V ′(Xt+h(j))
Pt+h
.
Since all updating firms will choose the same reset price, the optimal reset price relative to the
aggregate price index becomes p∗t ≡ P
∗
t
Pt
. Then the optimal pricing condition (15) becomes :
p∗t=
θ
θ − 1
x1,t
x2,t
, (15)
5A fraction (1− ξp) of these firms can optimally adjust its price (Calvo, 1983).
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where x1,t and x2,t are auxiliary variables and can be written recursively as
x1,t = λ
r
tνtXt + βξpEt(pit+1)
θx1,t+1, (16)
and
x2,t = λ
r
tXt + βξpEt(pit+1)
θ−1x1,t+1. (17)
The term λrt in these equations is the marginal utility of an additional unit of real income received
by household and Xt is the aggregate gross output.
2.2 Households and wage setting
2.2.1 Labor aggregators
Households6 supply Lt(i) units of differentiated labor to labour aggregators. These firms assemble
composite labor from differentiated, individual-specific labour according to the following aggrega-
tion function :
Lt =
(∫ 1
0
Lt(i)
σ−1
σ di
) σ
σ−1
, (18)
where σ denotes the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between labor types, with σ > 1.
Labor aggregators are pricetakers in both their output and input markets. They sell composite
labor to intermediate producers at the aggregate wage, Wt while each unit of differentiated labor
costs, Wt(i). Thus, input demand for labor of type-i is given by
Lt(i) =
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)−σ
Lt. (19)
Inserting this demand function for input i back into the CES aggregator yields the aggregate wage
index, i.e
W 1−σt =
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)
1−σdi. (20)
6There is a continuum of households, indexed by i ∈ (0, 1).
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2.2.2 Households
In this economy, households are monopoly suppliers of differentiated labor services. The represen-
tative household has the following expected lifetime utility7 :
max
Ct,Lt(i),Kt+1,Bt+1,It,Zt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ln (Ct − bCt−1)− ηLt(i)
1+χ
1 + χ
)
,
subject to
Pt
(
Ct + It +
a(Zt)Kt
εI,τt
)
+
Bt+1
1 + it
≤Wt(i)Lt(i) +RktZtKt + Πt +Bt + Tt, (21)
and
Kt+1 = ϑtε
I
t
(
1− S
(
It
It−1
))
It + (1− δ)Kt, (22)
with
a(Zt) = γ1(Zt − 1) + γ2
2
(Zt − 1)2,
and
S
(
It
It−1
)
=
κ
2
(
It
It−1
− gI
)2
.
where 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor, 0 < δ < 1 a depreciation rate, and 0 ≤ b < 1 measures internal
habit formation. χ is the inverse of the Frisch-labor-supply elasticity. γ1 and γ2 are parameters
to be calibrated. κ is an investment adjustment cost parameter that is strictly positive. Bt+1 is
a stock of nominal governmental bonds in t+1. Πt is distributed dividends from firms, and Tt is
lump-sum transfer from the government net of taxes. Zt is the level of capital utilization and a(Zt)
is the utilization adjustment cost function,with a(1) = 0, a′(1) = 0, and a′′(1) > 0. S
(
It
It−1
)
is an
investment adjustment cost, satisfying S (gI) = 0, S
′ (gI) = 0, and S′′ (gI) > 0, where gI ≥ 1 is the
steady state (gross) growth rate of investment.
7Utility is separable and we assume that households are identical with respect to non-labor choices; hence we drop
the i subscripts. For details, see Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000).
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The investment-specific term follows the deterministic trend :
εI,τt = gεIε
I,τ
t−1 (23)
where gεI is the gross growth rate and grows at the gross rate gεI ≥ 1 in each period8.
The exogenous variable ϑt captures the stochastic marginal efficiency of investment shock :
ϑt = (ϑt−1)ρI exp
(
sIu
I
t
)
with uIt ∼ iid (0, 1) . (24)
The autoregressive parameter ρI governs the persistence of the process and satisfies 0 ≤ ρI< 1. The
shock is scaled by the known standard deviation equal to sI and u
I
t is the innovation drawn from
a mean zero normal distribution.
The first-order conditions for consumption, capital utilization, investment, capital and bonds are
respectively :
λrt =
1
Ct − bCt−1 − Et
βb
Ct+1 − bCt , (25)
where λrt = Ptλt, which is the marginal utility of an extra good;
rkt =
a′(Zt)
εI,τt
; (26)
λrt = µtε
I,τ
t ϑt
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)
− S′
(
It
It−1
)]
+ βEtµt+1ε
I,τ
t+1ϑt+1S
′
(
It+1
It
)[
It+1
It
]2
; (27)
µt = βEtλ
r
t+1
(
rkt+1Zt+1 −
a(Zt+1)
εI,τt+1
)
+ β(1− δ)Etµt+1; (28)
λrt = βEtλ
r
t+1(1 + it)pi
−1
t+1. (29)
8With the implicit normalization that it begins at 1 in period 0 i.e εI,τ0 = 1
10
2.2.3 Wage setting
Households get to update their wages each period with the probability (1− ξw). The optimal wage
Wt(i) is obtained by maximizing :
Et
∞∑
h=0
(βξw)
h
(
− η
1 + χ
(Lt+h(i))
−σ(1+χ) + λt+hWt(i)Lt+h(i)
)
. (30)
subject to
Lt+h(i) =
(
Wt(i)
Wt+h
)−σ
Lt+h
The first order condition implies that
w∗t =
σ
σ − 1
f1,t
f2,t
. (31)
Recursively the terms f1,t and f2,t evolve as follows
f1,t = η
(
wt
w∗t
)σ(1+χ)
L1+χt + βξwEt(pit+1)
σ(1+χ)
(
w∗t+1
w∗t
)σ(1+χ)
f1,t+1, (32)
and
f2,t = λ
r
t
(
wt
w∗t
)σ
Lt + βξwEt(pit+1)
σ−1
(
w∗t+1
w∗t
)σ
f2,t+1. (33)
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2.3 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy consists of a Talor-type rule. It responds to deviations of inflation from an exoge-
nous steady state target, pi, and to deviations of output growth from its trend level, gY , up to a
stochastic shock is of the form :
1 + it
1 + i
=
(
1 + it−1
1 + i
)ρi [(pit
pi
)αpi ( Yt
Yt−1
g−1Y
)αy]1−ρi
εrt . (34)
with it and i being respectively the nominal and steady-state value of the nominal interest rate,
pit
pi is the inflation gap and
Yt
Y the output gap. The interest rate smooting parameter is given by
ρi, αpi and αy are the control parameters, and ε
r
t is an exogenous shock to the policy rule, where
εrt∼iid
(
0, σ2εr
)
. To ensure determinacy, we assume that 0 ≤ ρi < 1, αpi > 1 and αy ≥ 0.
2.4 Aggregation
The aggregate price level and wage evolve according to :
1 = ξp(pit)
θ−1 + (1− ξp) (p∗t )1−θ , (35)
w1−σt = ξw
(
wt−1
pit
)1−σ
+ (1− ξw) (w∗t )1−σ . (36)
With real GDP being the aggregate production of the goods, Xt, minus the aggregate produc-
tion of intermediate inputs, Γt, where Γt =
∫ 1
0
Γt(j)dj = φ
V˜t
Pt
(
st
Xt
At
+
Υt
At
F
)
, where st =∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
dj, is a measure of price dispersion. Hence, the real GDP or aggregate net out-
put, Yt is given by :
Yt = Xt − Γt (37)
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Market-clearing requires that
∫ 1
0
K̂t(j)dj = K̂t and
∫ 1
0
Lt(j)dj = Lt respectively for capital services
and labor inputs. Hence, aggregate gross output can be written as
stXt= AtΓ
φ
t
(
K̂αt L
1−α
t
)1−φ−ΥtF, (38)
We know that
∫ 1
0
Xt(j)dj = stXt, hence the aggregate input demands can be written as
Γt(j) = φmct (stXt(j) + ΥtF ) , (39)
K̂t(j) = α(1− φ)mct
rkt
(stXt(j) + ΥtF ) , (40)
Lt(j) = (1− α)(1− φ)mct
wt
(stXt(j) + ΥtF ) . (41)
The aggregate resource constraint is therefore given by :
Yt = Ct + It +
a(Zt)
εI,τt
Kt (42)
2.5 Balanced Growth
Trend growth from the deterministic trends in neutral and investment-specific productivity,
implies that a balanced-growth path exists where output, consumption, investment, intermediate
inputs, and the real wage will all grow at the same rate : gY = gI = gΓ = gw = gΥ =
Υt
Υt−1 . In order
to induce stationarity in these variables, they are scaled by the deterministic growth rate Υt. The
capital stock will grow faster due to growth in investment-specific productivity, with K˜t =
Kt
Υtε
I,τ
t
being stationary.
Labor hours, capital utilization and real marginal cost will be stationary, as will inflation rate and
the relative reset price.
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2.6 Measuring Welfare
The value function of the ith household is:
Vt(i) = ln(Ct − bCt−1)− ηLt(i)
1+χ
1 + χ
+ βEtVt+1(i) (43)
Measuring aggregate welfare is not obvious because of the heterogeneity in employment outcomes.
Defining aggregate welfare as the un-weighted sum of individual welfare, then
Vt =
∫ 1
0
(
ln(Ct − bCt−1)− ηLt(i)
1+χ
1 + χ
+ βEtVt+1(i)
)
di, (44)
since households only differ though their labor supply, this can be written as
Vt = ln(Ct − bCt−1)− η
∫ 1
0
Nt(i)
1+χ
1 + χ
di+ βEtVt+1. (45)
Now, using the demand curve for each variety of labor, we can write this as:
Vt = ln(Ct − bCt−1)− η L
1+χ
t
1 + χ
∫ 1
0
(
Wt(i)
Wt
)σ(1+χ)
di+ βEtVt+1 (46)
The value function is therefore
Vt = ln(Ct − bCt−1)− η L
1+χ
t
1 + χ
vwt + βEtVt+1 (47)
The aggregate welfare in terms of aggregate variables is given by
Wt = ln(Ct − bCt−1)− ηvwt
L1+χt
1 + χ
+ βEtWt+1, (48)
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where vwt is a wage dispersion variable that can be written recursively as
vwt = (1− ξw)
(
w∗t
wt
)σ(1+χ)
+ ξw
(
wtpit
wt−1
)σ(1+χ)
vwt−1. (49)
The right side term summarizes the different factors that may affect wage dispersion, and therefore
the welfare costs of long-term inflation.
As in Ascari,Phaneuf,and Sims (2015), we define the consumption equivalent measure, λ, as the
constant fraction of consumption that households have to give up (or have to be given) each period
in the case of zero percent inflation rate to have the same value for Vt that would be obtained
alternatively in the case of 4.75 percent inflation rate in the pre-1984 period or in that of 2.29
percent inflation rate in the post-1984 period.
We consider two different consumption equivalents, one based on steady states λss and the other
on stochastic means λm:
λss = 1− exp [(1− β)(V ss − V ssB )] (50)
λm = 1− exp [(1− β)(E (V )− E (VB))] (51)
where B stands for benchmark case and the absence of a subscript denotes the alternative case. A
SS subscript stands for the non-stochastic steady state, and E (.) the unconditionnal expectations
operator.
3 Calibration
In order to generate quantitative results, the calibration of the model parameters need to
be set. Tables 1 to 4 summarize our baseline model parameter values into non-shock and shock
parameters over both subsamples under consideration.
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3.1 Non-shock Parameters
We set our non-shock parameters (tables 1 and 2) to standard values found in the business
cycle literature : The households discount factor is set to β = 0.99. The capital depreciation rate
δ = 0.025, that corresponds to an annual capital depreciation of 10 percent. The capital services
share is set to 1/3. η = 6 is a scaling parameter on disutility from labor and the inverse Frish
elasticity of labor supply to χ = 1. We set the consumption habit formation parameter b to 0.7
following Fuhrer (2000). The investment adjustment cost is set to κ = 3 in line with the value used
in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005). We choose the utilization cost γ2 equals to 0.05 to
match a capital utilization elasticity equal to 1.5 (Basu ad Kimball,1997; Dotsey and King, 2006).
Table 1: Non-Shock Parameters, Pre-1984
β δ α η χ b κ γ2
0.99 0.025 1/3 6 1 0.7 3 0.05
θ σ ξp ξw φ ρi αpi αy
6 6 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.81 1.65 0.2
The elasticity parameters for goods and labor are set to a uniform value σ = θ = 6, implying a
steady-state price and wage markups of 20 percent (Liu and Phaneuf, 2007). With θ = 6, this
implies an intermediate inputs share φ of 0.61.
The Calvo price and wage parameters are set to ξp = 0.66 and ξw = 0.66 respectively. The Calvo
price is consistent with the evidence reported in Bils and Klenow (2004) and the value assigned
to the Calvo probability of wage with the evidence reported in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2005).
Based on the estimates produced by Smets and Wouters (2007), we asign the following values to
parameters describing the monetary policy rule : ρi = 0.81, αpi = 1.65, and αy = 0.2 (pre-1984)
and ρi = 0.84, αpi = 1.77, and αy = 0.16 (post-1984).
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Table 2: Non-Shock Parameters, Post-1984
β δ α η χ b κ γ2
0.99 0.025 1/3 6 1 0.7 3 0.05
θ σ ξp ξw φ ρi αpi αy
6 6 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.84 1.77 0.16
3.2 Trend inflation, Trend Growth and Shock Parameters
As in Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2015), we use series from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) to compute trend inflation and trend growth observed in data. However, our approach is
based on a split sample. We use quarterly data covering the subsamples periods : 1960:I - 1983:IV
and 1984:I - 2007:III. Following Gali and Gambetti (2009), the split before and after 1984 is a date
generally viewed as the starting point of the period of enhanced stability in the US economy.
We define :
1. Investment as expenditures on new durables plus private fixed investment,
2. Consumption as consumption of non-durables and services.
We generate real series to get the corresponding deflators. We first, compute real series of the
individual components by dividing by their own deflators from the National Income and Product
Account (NIPA) tables. We then, compute the growth rates of the real series by using one period
lagged nominal share weights.
To compute the real growth rate of non-durable and services consumption we first take the share-
weighted growth rates of the real component series. We then compute price indices for consumption
and investment as the ratios of the nominal to the real series. The relative price of investment is
the ratio of the implied price index for investment goods to the price index for consumption goods.
The average growth rate of the relative price from each time period is -0.0029 and -0.0065. This
implies a calibration of gI = 1.0029 and gI = 1.0065 for pre- and post-1984 respectively..
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To obtain the price deflator we take the ratio between the nominal and real series. The average
growth rate of the price index over the periods 1960:I-1983:IV is 0.011679 and 0.005671 for 1984:I-
2007:III. This implies pi∗ = 1.011679 (or 1.0475 at an annual frequency) and pi∗ = 1.005671 (or
1.0229 at an annual frequency) for each time period respectively.
To compute real per capita GDP, we subtract the log civilian non-institutionalized population from
the real GDP log-level . The average growth rates of this series over the subsample periods are
0.00534 and 0.006088 resectively. The standard deviation of output growth over each time period
is 0.00932377 pre-1984 and 0.00562996 post-1984.
From the calculations above we get gY = 1.00534 and gY = 1.006088 and gI = 1.0029 and gI =
1.0065. To generate the corresponding output volatility, we then take g1−φA .
To calculate the shocks, we proceed as follows. Given these growth rates and pi∗, we refer to the
baseline model and take sI , sA, and sr to match output growth volatility over each subsamples.
This requires taking a stand on the percentage contribution of each type of shocks to output growth
volatility.
Based on the evidence produced by Justiniano and Primiceri (2008, 2010), an investment-specific
shock contributes to 50 percent of this output volatility. This compares with 35 percent for the
neutral technology, and for 15 percent for the monetary policy shock. If we set the AR(1) coefficients
ρI to 0.81 and ρA to 0.95, then the resulting variances for the shocks are (see table 3) : sI = 0.0164,
sA = 0.0033 and sr = 0.002 (pre-1984) and sI = 0.0089, sA = 0.0018 and sr = 0.001 (post-1984).
Table 3: Shock Parameters
Pre-1984
gA gI ρr sr ρI sI ρA sA
1.002581−φ 1.0029 0 0.002 0.81 0.0164 0.95 0.0033
Post-1984
gA gI ρr sr ρI sI ρA sA
1.00191−φ 1.0065 0 0.001 0.81 0.0089 0.95 0.0018
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For the subsample post-1984 period, we have gA = 1.00188
(1−φ) and gI = 1.00652 with output
quarterly growth rate of 1.00608. The contribution of technology progress is 1.00283 and that of
marginal efficiency of investment progress is 1.00325.
4 Results
4.1 The Welfare Costs of inflation
In this section we focus on the implications of the welfare costs of inflation due to monetary
policy changes and shifting trend inflation across the two subperiods. To mesure these welfare
costs, we consider two different sets of consumption equivalent metrics : one for means and one
for steady states9. For each set we compute welfare costs for going from pi∗ = 1 to pi∗ = 1.0475
(all annualized) and from pi∗ = 1 to pi∗ = 1.0229 (all annualized) respectively for pre- and post-
1984 subsample periods. We produce two different sets of welfare results : one with trend growth
(baseline case) and one without trend growth (alterntive case).
Table 4 reports the mean consumption equivalent in the baseline case. It shows that going from 0
to 4.75 percent rate of trend inflation causes mean welfare losses increases to around 8.38 percent
of consumption in the pre-1984 period. However, a decline in trend inflation at 2.29 percent
annual inflation in the post-1984, causes mean welfare losses decreases to about 2.34 percent of
consumption.
Table 4: Consumption Equivalents, Mean
pi∗ 1.00→
Pre-1984
1.0000 0
1.0475 0.0838
Post-1984
1.0000 0
1.0229 0.0234
9For more details on the two metrics see Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims (2015).
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Table 5 describes the welfare cost in terms of steady states in the baseline case. The cost of going
from 0 to 4.75 percent in trend inflation is about 7.56 percent of consumption in the pre-1984
period; it’s around 2.26 percent of consumption as trend inflation rises from 0 to 2.29 percent in
the post-1984 subperiod.
Table 5: Consumption Equivalents, Steady State
pi∗ 1.00→
Pre-1984
1.0000 0
1.0475 0.0756
Post-1984
1.0000 0
1.0229 0.0226
From tables 4 and 5, the welfare costs respond symmetrically to a rise and a decline in trend
inflation, trend growth and the level of volatility across both subperiods. It is worth noting that
the size of the magnitude is not proportional and that the welfare costs are larger in the pre-1984
period than in the post-1984 period. These results are in line with the evidence produced by
Christiano (2015) in so that the high trend inflation of the 1970s, in the Great Inflation period,
was more costly.
We also notice that the welfare means change by more than the steady states and exceed the steady
state losses across both subsample periods. This can be illustrated by the consumption equivalent
welfare changes, where the consumption equivalents based on means are about 8.38 percent at 4.75
percent in trend inflation and about 2.34 percent at 2.29 percent in trend inflation larger than on
steady states.
To isolate the implications of trend inflation on welfare losses, we run our model without trend
GDP growth i.e we set trend growth to 1 in the calibration. The results are reported in tables
6 and 7. Table 6 indicates that based on means the welfare cost of going from 0 to 4.75 percent
inflation is about 4 percent of consumption and it is arournd 1.37 percent of consumption at 2.29
percent of trend inflation.
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Table 6: Consumption Equivalents, Mean
pi∗ 1.00→
Pre-1984
1.0000 0
1.0475 0.040
Post-1984
1.0000 0
1.0229 0.00137
In terms of steady states, table 7 reveals that going from 0 to 4.75 percent of trend inflation in the
pre-1984 period, causes the welfare losses to amount to around 3.57 percent of consumption and
it’s about 0.12 percent of consumption at 2.29 percent of trend inflation in the post-1984 subsample
period.
Table 7: Consumption Equivalents, Steady State
pi∗ 1.00→
Pre-1984
1.0000 0
1.0475 0.0357
Post-1984
1.0000 0
1.0229 0.00123
The welfare costs of inflation are larger in the baseline case (tables 4 and 5) than in the case without
trend growth (tables 6 and 7). It is worth noting that the effects of trend growth on welfare come in
through wage dispersion (see notes next to equations 48 and 49 for more details). The interactions
between trend growth and wage dispersion in the baseline case make inflation so much more costly
in the pre-1984 subperiod.
In the case without trend growth, the first order wage dispersion effects disappear and inflation
costs values are quite small i.e mean and steady state welfare are much lower. However even in this
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case, the welfare costs in the pre-1984 are larger than in the post-1984 subperiod, with the mean
consumption equivalent welfare losses higher.
Using the alternative calibration (see table 12 in the appendix), we find the following results. First,
an increase in the variance of shocks to the trend inflation process increases mean welfare costs
by increasing the volatilities of output and inflation in the pre-1984 subsample period and their
subsequent decline in the post-1984 period as the variance of shocks relative to trend inflation
process goes down (see tables 13 and 14 in the appendix). The steady state welfare level remains
stable relative to the baseline calibration as the variance of shocks increases. Second, from tables 15
and 16, welfare costs decrease not so much as in the baseline case. The basic insights obtained from
this high- and low-volatility periods is that the consumption equivalent welfare losses are higher
the more volatility there is.
4.2 Macroeconomic dynamics
4.2.1 Unconditional volatilities
Tables 8 reports the magnitude of volatility changes in the pre-1984 and post-1984 sample
periods by showing the standard deviation for output, output growth, and inflation. As indicated
in the table for the three variables aforecited, the standard deviation for the post-1984 is less than
half that in the pre-1984 period.
Table 8: Unconditional volatilities
pi∗ σ(Y ) σ(∆Y ) σ(pi)
Pre-1984 1.0475 0.1084 0.0120 0.0032
Post-1984 1.0229 0.0449 0.0064 0.0015
Variation - -0.5859 -0.4676 -0.5409
The last row in table 8 gives the variations in percentage between the two sub-periods. We can see
that all the aforecited variables have experienced a large decline in their volatility in the post-1984
sample period. However, the magnitude of that reduction is not proportional : -0.59 for output,
-0.47 for output growth and -0.54 for inflation. Thus, the decline in the volatility of output growth
is not as large as those experienced by inflation and output. In line with the above, we note that
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trend inflation tends to increase output volatility in the pre-1984 period and to reduce it in the
post-1984 by more than inflation and output growth.
The results so far do not allow to determine the sources of those changes in volatilities. To address
this issue, we turn to the analysis of the conditional moments.
4.2.2 Conditional volatilities
In what follows, we analyse the sources of the changes in the standard deviations of output,
output growth and inflation conditional on neutral productivity, MEI and monetary shocks.
Table 9: Output volatility
pi∗ suinvs sua sur
Pre-1984 1.0475 0.0023 0.0040 0.0006
Post-1984 1.0229 0.0017 0.0017 0.0006
Variation - -0.2781 -0.5625 -0.04
Conditional on shocks, we see that neutral productivity shocks is the main driving force behind
the decline in output (see tables 9). On the other hand, we see that the volatility of the level
of output is increasing in trend inflation in the pre-1984 period and decreasing in the post-1984
conditional on neutral productivity shockq by far more than conditional on MEI or monetary
shocks. Monetary shock has a relatively small and stable contribution to the volatility of output,
output growth and inflation accross the sample periods (see tables 9, 10 and 11). However, in their
baseline specification, Gali and Gambetti (2009) find that nontechnology shocks appear to be the
main source of the decline in the volatility of output. The main explanation can be found in the
nature of their empirical approach10, the uncertainty associated with their estimated coefficients is
large.
Table 10: Output growth volatility
pi∗ suinvs sua sur
Pre-1984 1.0475 0.0019 0.0017 0.0004
Post-1984 1.0229 0.0011 0.0008 0.0003
Variation - -0.4232 -0.5084 -0.1235
10They use a time-varying VAR approach whereas we use estimates from Smets and Wouters (2007) based on
Bayesian approach to calibrate the Fed’s reaction function.
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Table 10 reports the output growth volatility conditional on the three types of shocks. It shows
that both neutral productivity and MEI shocks play an important role with the former as the
main explanation for the decline in output growth volatility. This result concur with the findings
in Justiniano and Primiceri (2006) who find that it’s the investment-specific technology shocks
and in Gali and Gambetti (2009) who point to an important contribution of nontechnology shocks.
However, in their alternative specification, this role of nontechnology shocks in the volatility decline
is shared with technology shocks (Gali and Gambetti, 2009).
Table 11: Inflation volatility
pi∗ suinvs sua sur
Pre-1984 1.0475 0.0002 0.0005 0.0001
Post-1984 1.0229 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
Variation - -0.5797 -0.5411 -0.1363
Table 11 describes the inflation volatility relative to different types of shocks. Its shows that
fluctuations in the inflation volatility across the two subsamples are largely accounted for by both
neutral productivity and MEI shocks with monetary shocks playing a smaller role. The interaction
between trend inflation and MEI shocks accounts for the larger contribution of the latter relative
to that of the neutral productivity shocks.
The analysis of tables 8 though 11 points to the following findings. First, we note that neutral
productivity shock play an important role as a source of the increase in output and output growth
volatility in the pre-1984 and the subsequent decline in the post-1984. Second, the MEI shocks
is responsible for inflation volatility by more than the neutral productivity shocks. Third, the
monetary shocks has a relatively smaller contribution to the volatility of output, output growth
and inflation in each sample period. Finally, the interactions between trend inflation and different
types of shocks, as trend inflation goes up and down across the subsamples, account for much of
the results.
In the results so far, we have assumed that investment persistence parameter ρI is set to 0.81 and
the uncertainty associated with our monetary policy estimated coefficients is small in line with
Smets and Wouters (2007). In what follows, we assume that ρI is set to 0.9 and the variation
associated with our monetary policy estimated coefficients between the two subperiods is large in
the spirit of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Gali and Gambetti (2009).
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Thus, we conduct a theoritical exercise and asign the following values to parameters describing the
monetary policy rule (see table 12) : ρi = 0.75, αpi = 1.15, and αy = 0.125 (in the pre-1984 period)
and ρi = 0.75, αpi = 2.3, and αy = 0.125 (in the post-1984 period).
We find the following results (see tables 17 though 20 in the appendix). First, we see from table 17
that the decline in the volatility of inflation is larger than those experienced by output and output
growth. Also we note that as trend inflation goes up and down, it tends to increase inflation in the
pre-1984 period and to reduce it in the post-1984 by more than output and output growth. Second,
from table 18 fluctuations in output volatility is accounted for by the neutral productivity shocks
and appears to display a larger downward trend than MEI and monetary shocks. The contribution
of the latter is much smaller. Third, from table 20 the interaction between trend inflation and MEI
shocks is responsible for inflation volatility by more than the monetary and neutral productivity
shocks (Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims, 2015). Finally, from table 19 we note that the monetary shocks
has a relatively larger contribution to the volatility of output growth and its subsequent decline.
This resultat is consistent with Gali and Gambetti (2009).
The basic insight obtained from these two set of results is that the findings based on theoritical
exercise (i.e alternative specification) are more plausible and consistent with the results in the
literature than those on the baseline specification.
4.2.3 Impulse responses analysis
In this section, we analyse impulse responses functions relative to neutral productivity, MEI
and monetary shocks. Figures display side by side the impulse responses over the pre-1984 (solid
lines) and post-1984 (dashed lines) periods.
We restrict our analysis to the aforementioned variables and produce three sets of figures. In the first
set, IRFs are based on the baseline calibration (see figures 1 though 3). Next, we use the alternative
calibration from table 12 to generate IRFs in figures 4 though 6. Finally, to further single out the
contribution of monetary policy and that of trend inflation, we conduct an experiment that produce
side by side IRFs with three curves (see figures 7 though 9) : solid lines are for the pre-1984 period,
dashed lines for the post-1984 period and dashed-red lines relative to our experiment.
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Figures 1 and 4 display the dynamic responses of variables to a neutral productivity shock. In both
cases, it is noticeable that the impulse responses of output over the pre-1984 and post-1984 periods
differ substantially, with the decline in amplitude in the post-1984 period being significantly large
by more than in the case of MEI and monetary shocks (see also tables 9 and 18). In this perspective,
neutral productivity shocks appear to be the main source of contribution to the volatility of output.
Over the sample periods the response of output to a monetary shock shows a characteristic hump
shape and displays substantial persistence (see figure 3). Instead, the magnitude of the change
between the pre- and post-1984 periods is smaller as reported in table 9 relative to output volatility
conditional on a monetary shock. This is due to our Taylor rule estimates in the baseline calibration
which are consistent with Smets and Wouters (2007). However, when taking into account the
alternative calibration, the magnitude of the change varies by more than in the baseline case (see
figure 6 and table 18). Thus, in both cases we see that monetary shocks have a relatively small
and stable contribution to the volatility of output.
From tables 11 and 20 we have seen that fluctuations in the inflation volatility are largely accounted
for by MEI shocks by more than the neutral productivity shocks. This feature of the conditional
second moments is reflected by parallel changes in the inflation impulse responses in figures 2 and
5 as trend inflation goes up and down over the sample periods.
From table 19 we have noted that the monetary shocks play an important role as the main explana-
tion for the volatility of output growth and its subsequent decline over the pre-1984 and post-1984
periods. Accordingly, the changes experienced over both periods in the output growth conditional
second moments must be reflecting parallel changes in its impulse responses. Thus, the larger share
of the contribution to the output growth volatility is associated with monetary shocks.
Figures 7 though 9 display IRFs from our experiment. We produce side by side IRFs with three
curves. The third curve is a modification of the pre-1984 period wherein we replace the corre-
sponding trend inflation and taylor rule estimates by those of the post-1984 period. We restrict
our analysis to figure 9 which has the same features as in figure 6. The aim of our theoritical
exercise is to figure out the contribution of monetary policy over both periods and the implica-
tions of trend inflation. We find that changes in the Fed’s response to macroeconomic variables
(or policy response to the shocks) along with the decline in trend inflation are the main sources of
the shift in macroeconomic variables volatilities (see the dashed-red lines in figure 9). We concur
with the original conclusion of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and
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Zandweghe, Hirose and Kurozumi (2015). However, our results are in line with those of Coibion
and Gorodnichenko (2011) and Arias, Ascari, Branzoli and Castelnuovo (2015).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided the implications of monetary policy changes on the welfare
in the U.S economy over the sample periods. We use a New-Keynesian model inspired by Ascari,
Phaneuf and Sims (2015). However, our approach is quite different. We first calibrate the Fed’s
reaction function in both periods based on estimates in the literature. We then combine it with
our calibrated medium-scale New Keynesian model.
Our findings are consistent with the results in the literature relative to the welfare costs of inflation
over both sample periods. The results show that welfare losses are larger in the pre-1984 period
than in the post-1984 (Christiano, 2015). We also notice that the welfare mean change by more
than the steady state and exceed the latter across both subsample periods. The basic insight
obtained from this high- and low-volatility environments is that welfare losses are higher the more
volatility there is (Lester, Pries and Sims, 2014).
On the other hand, we find the following results relative to macroeconomic variables volatilities.
First, we see that the decline in the volatility of inflation is larger than those experienced by output
and output growth. As trend inflation goes up and down, it tends to increase inflation in the
pre-1984 period and to reduce it in the post-1984 by more than output and output growth. Second,
fluctuations in output volatility is accounted for by the neutral productivity shocks and appears to
display a larger downward trend than MEI and monetary shocks. Third, the interaction between
trend inflation and MEI shocks is responsible for inflation volatility by more than the monetary and
neutral productivity shocks (Ascari, Phaneuf and Sims, 2015). Finally, we note that the monetary
shocks has a relatively larger contribution to the volatility of output growth and its subsequent
decline (Gali and Gambetti, 2009).
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A Output and trend growth rates
Taking gA and gI to denote the deterministic trend growth rates of TFP and MEI, the growth
factor Υt is then given by:
gΥ = g
1
(1−φ)(1−α)
A g
α
1−α
I
The benchmark deterministic growth over pre-1984 subsample period is given by gA = 1.0026
(1−φ)
and gI = 1.0029 with output grows at quarterly rate: 1.00533. The contribution of technology
progress is 1.003869 and that of MEI progress is 1.001461.
B Alternative calibration
Table 12: Alternative calibration
ρi αpi αy sua suinvs sur
Before 1984 0.75 1.15 0.125 0.0028 0.0117 0.002
After 1984 0.75 2.3 0.125 0.0016 0.0106 0.0019
C The welfare costs with alternative calibration
Table 13: Consumption Equivalents, Mean
pi∗ 1.00→
Pre-1984
1.0000 0
1.0475 0.1356
Post-1984
1.0000 0
1.0229 0.0237
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Table 14: Consumption Equivalents, Steady State
pi∗ 1.00→
Pre-1984
1.0000 0
1.0475 0.0756
Post-1984
1.0000 0
1.0229 0.0226
D The welfare costs without trend growth (alt. calibration)
Table 15: Consumption Equivalents, Mean
pi∗ 1.00→
Pre-1984
1.0000 0
1.0475 0.0919
Post-1984
1.0000 0
1.0229 0.0013
Table 16: Consumption Equivalents, Steady State
pi∗ 1.00→
Pre-1984
1.0000 0
1.0475 0.0358
Post-1984
1.0000 0
1.0229 0.0012
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E Volatilities with alternative calibration
Table 17: Unconditional volatilities
pi∗ σ(Y ) σ(∆Y ) σ(pi)
Pre-1984 1.0475 0.1239 0.0094 0.0068
Post-1984 1.0229 0.0394 0.0057 0.0012
Variation - -0.6820 -0.3936 -0.8235
Table 18: Output volatility
pi∗ suinvs sua sur
Pre-1984 1.0475 0.0015 0.0031 0.0011
Post-1984 1.0229 0.0010 0.0013 0.0009
Variation - -0.3429 -0.5873 -0.1750
Table 19: Output growth volatility
pi∗ suinvs sua sur
Pre-1984 1.0475 0.0014 0.0011 0.0008
Post-1984 1.0229 0.0009 0.0007 0.0005
Variation - -0.3492 -0.3433 -0.3774
Table 20: Inflation volatility
pi∗ suinvs sua sur
Pre-1984 1.0475 0.0006 0.0003 0.0002
Post-1984 1.0229 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
Variation - -0.8311 -0.4093 -0.5013
33
F IRFs with the baseline calibration
Figure 1: Neutral Shock
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Figure 2: MEI Shock
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Figure 3: Monetary Shock
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G IRFs with alternative calibration
Figure 4: Neutral Shock
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
output
0 5 10 15 20
-10
-5
0
5
x 10-3 Hours
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
Consumption
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
Investment
0 5 10 15 20
-5
0
5
10
x 10-3Intermediate Input
0 5 10 15 20
0
2
4
6
x 10-3 realwage
0 5 10 15 20
-2
0
2
4
x 10-3capital rental rate
0 5 10 15 20
-6
-4
-2
0
x 10-4nominal interest rate
0 5 10 15 20
-3
-2
-1
0
1
x 10-3 marginal cost
0 5 10 15 20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
x 10-4 inflation
0 5 10 15 20
4
6
8
10
12
x 10-3 productivity
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
Marginal Rate of Substitution
0 5 10 15 20
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
Wage Mark up
0 5 10 15 20
-1
0
1
2
3
x 10-3 Price Mark up
 
 
before 84
after 84
37
Figure 5: MEI Shock
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
output
0 5 10 15 20
0
2
4
6
8
x 10-3 Hours
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
Consumption
0 5 10 15 20
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
Investment
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
Intermediate Input
0 5 10 15 20
0
1
2
3
4
x 10-3 realwage
0 5 10 15 20
-6
-4
-2
0
2
x 10-3capital rental rate
0 5 10 15 20
-5
0
5
10
15
x 10-4nominal interest rate
0 5 10 15 20
-5
0
5
10
x 10-4 marginal cost
0 5 10 15 20
-5
0
5
10
15
x 10-4 inflation
0 5 10 15 20
2
4
6
8
x 10-3 productivity
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
Marginal Rate of Substitution
0 5 10 15 20
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
Wage Mark up
0 5 10 15 20
-10
-5
0
5
x 10-4 Price Mark up
 
 
before 84
after 84
38
Figure 6: Monetary Shock
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H Experiment with alternative calibration
Figure 7: Neutral Shock
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Figure 8: MEI Shock
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Figure 9: Monetary Shock
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